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Abstract— Collaborative spectrum sensing among secondary
users (SUs) in cognitive networks is shown to yield a significant
performance improvement. However, there exists an inherent
trade off between the gains in terms of probability of detection
of the primary user (PU) and the costs in terms of false alarm
probability. In this paper, we study the impact of this trade off
on the topology and the dynamics of a network of SUs seeking to
reduce the interference on the PU through collaborative sensing.
Moreover, while existing literature mainly focused on centralized
solutions for collaborative sensing, we propose distributed collab-
oration strategies through game theory. We model the problem
as a non-transferable coalitional game, and propose a distributed
algorithm for coalition formation through simple merge and split
rules. Through the proposed algorithm, SUs can autonomously
collaborate and self-organize into disjoint independent coalitions,
while maximizing their detection probability taking into account
the cooperation costs (in terms of false alarm). We study the
stability of the resulting network structure, and show that a
maximum number of SUs per formed coalition exists for the
proposed utility model. Simulation results show that the proposed
algorithm allows a reduction of up to 86.6% of the average
missing probability per SU (probability of missing the detection
of the PU) relative to the non-cooperative case, while maintaining
a certain false alarm level. In addition, through simulations, we
compare the performance of the proposed distributed solution
with respect to an optimal centralized solution that minimizes the
average missing probability per SU. Finally, the results also show
how the proposed algorithm autonomously adapts the network
topology to environmental changes such as mobility.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an increasing growth in
wireless services, yielding a huge demand on the radio spec-
trum. However, the spectrum resources are scarce and most
of them have been already licensed to existing operators.
Recent studies showed that the actual licensed spectrum re-
mains unoccupied for large periods of time [1]. In order to
efficiently exploit these spectrum holes, cognitive radio (CR)
has been proposed [2]. By monitoring and adapting to the
environment, CRs (secondary users) can share the spectrum
with the licensed users (primary users), operating whenever
the primary user (PU) is not using the spectrum. Implementing
such flexible CRs faces several challenges [3]. For instance,
CRs must constantly sense the spectrum in order to detect the
presence of the PU and use the spectrum holes without causing
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harmful interference to the PU. Hence, efficient spectrum
sensing constitutes a major challenge in cognitive networks.
For sensing the presence of the PU, the secondary
users (SUs) must be able to detect the signal of the PU. Various
kinds of detectors can be used for spectrum sensing such as
matched filter detectors, energy detectors, cyclostationary de-
tectors or wavelet detectors [4]. However, the performance of
spectrum sensing is significantly affected by the degradation of
the PU signal due to path loss or shadowing (hidden terminal).
It has been shown that, through collaboration among SUs,
the effects of this hidden terminal problem can be reduced
and the probability of detecting the PU can be improved [5]–
[7]. For instance, in [5] the SUs collaborate by sharing their
sensing decisions through a centralized fusion center in the
network. This centralized entity combines the sensing bits
from the SUs using the OR-rule for data fusion and makes
a final PU detection decision. A similar centralized approach
is used in [6] using different decision-combining methods.
The authors in [7] propose spatial diversity techniques for
improving the performance of collaborative spectrum sensing
by combatting the error probability due to fading on the
reporting channel between the SUs and the central fusion
center. Existing literature mainly focused on the performance
assessment of collaborative spectrum sensing in the presence
of a centralized fusion center. However, in practice, the SUs
may belong to different service providers and they need to
interact with each other for collaboration without relying on
a centralized fusion center. Moreover, a centralized approach
can lead to a significant overhead and increased complexity.
The main contribution of this paper is to devise distributed
collaboration strategies for SUs in a cognitive network. An-
other major contribution is to study the impact on the network
topology of the inherent trade off that exists between the
collaborative spectrum sensing gains in terms of detection
probability and the cooperation costs in terms of false alarm
probability. This trade off can be pictured as a trade off
between reducing the interference on the PU (increasing the
detection probability) while maintaining a good spectrum uti-
lization (reducing the false alarm probability). For distributed
collaboration, we model the problem as a non-transferable
coalitional game and we propose a distributed algorithm for
coalition formation based on simple merge and split rules.
Through the proposed algorithm, each SU autonomously de-
cides to form or break a coalition for maximizing its utility
in terms of detection probability while accounting for a false
alarm cost. We show that, due to the cost for cooperation,
independent disjoint coalitions will form in the network. We
study the stability of the resulting coalition structure and show
that a maximum coalition size exists for the proposed utility
model. Through simulations, we assess the performance of
the proposed algorithm relative to the non-cooperative case,
we compare it with a centralized solution and we show
how the proposed algorithm autonomously adapts the network
topology to environmental changes such as mobility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the system model. In Section III, we present the
proposed coalitional game and prove different properties while
in Section IV we devise a distributed algorithm for coalition
formation. Simulation results are presented and analyzed in
Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a cognitive network consisting of N transmit-
receive pairs of SUs and a single PU. The SUs and the PU
can be either stationary and mobile. Since the focus is on
spectrum sensing, we are only interested in the transmitter
part of each of the N SUs. The set of all SUs is denoted
N = {1, . . . , N}. In a non-cooperative approach, each of the
N SUs continuously senses the spectrum in order to detect
the presence of the PU. For detecting the PU, we use energy
detectors which are one of the main practical signal detectors
in cognitive radio networks [5]–[7]. In such a non-cooperative
setting, assuming Rayleigh fading, the detection probability
and the false alarm probability of a SU i are, respectively,
given by Pd,i and Pf,i [5, Eqs. (2), (4)]
Pd,i = e
−λ
2
m−2∑
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1
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λ
2
)n
+
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Pf,i = Pf =
Γ(m, λ2 )
Γ(m)
, (2)
where m is the time bandwidth product, λ is the energy
detection threshold assumed the same for all SUs without
loss of generality as in [5]–[7], Γ(·, ·) is the incomplete
gamma function and Γ(·) is the gamma function. Moreover, γ¯i
represents the average SNR of the received signal from the PU
to SU given by γ¯i,PU = PPUhPU,iσ2 with PPU the transmit power of
the PU, σ2 the Gaussian noise variance and hPU,i = κ/dµPU,i
the path loss between the PU and SU i; κ being the path
loss constant, µ the path loss exponent and dPU,i the distance
between the PU and SU i. It is important to note that the non-
cooperative false alarm probability expression depends solely
on the detection threshold λ and does not depend on the SU’s
location; hence we dropped the subscript i in (2).
Moreover, an important metric that we will thoroughly use
is the missing probability for a SU i, which is defined as the
probability of missing the detection of a PU and given by [5]
Pm,i = 1− Pd,i. (3)
Fig. 1. An illustrative example of coalition formation for collaborative
spectrum sensing among SUs.
For instance, reducing the missing probability directly maps to
increasing the probability of detection and, thus, reducing the
interference on the PU. In order to minimize their missing
probabilities, the SUs will interact for forming coalitions
of collaborating SUs. Within each coalition S ⊆ N =
{1, . . . , N}, a SU, selected as coalition head, collects the
sensing bits from the coalition’s SUs and acts as a fusion
center in order to make a coalition-based decision on the
presence or absence of the PU. This can be seen as having
the centralized collaborative sensing of [5], [7] applied at
the level of each coalition with the coalition head being the
fusion center to which all the coalition members report. For
combining the sensing bits and making the final detection
decision, the coalition head will use the decision fusion OR-
rule. Within each coalition we take into account the probability
of error due to the fading on the reporting channel between
the SUs of a coalition and the coalition head [7]. Inside a
coalition S, assuming BPSK modulation in Rayleigh fading
environments, the probability of reporting error between a SU
i ∈ S and the coalition head k ∈ S is given by [8]
Pe,i,k =
1
2
(
1−
√
γ¯i,k
1 + γ¯i,k
)
, (4)
where γ¯i,k = Pihi,kσ2 is the average SNR for bit reporting
between SU i and the coalition head k inside S with Pi the
transmit power of SU i used for reporting the sensing bit to
k and hi,k = κdµ
i,k
the path loss between SU i and coalition
head k. Any SU can be chosen as a coalition head within a
coalition. However, for the remainder of this paper, we adopt
the following convention without loss of generality.
Convention 1: Within a coalition S, the SU k ∈ S having
the lowest non-cooperative missing probability Pm,k is chosen
as coalition head. Hence, the coalition head k of a coalition
S is given by k = argmin
i∈S
Pm,i with Pm,i given by (3).
The motivation behind Convention 1 is that the SU having the
lowest missing probability (best detection probability) within a
coalition should not risk sending his local sensing bit over the
fading reporting channel; and thus it will serve as a fusion
center for the other SUs in the coalition. By collaborative
sensing, the missing and false alarm probabilities of a coalition
S having coalition head k are, respectively, given by [7]
Qm,S =
∏
i∈S
[Pm,i(1 − Pe,i,k) + (1− Pm,i)Pe,i,k], (5)
Qf,S = 1−
∏
i∈S
[(1− Pf )(1 − Pe,i,k) + PfPe,i,k], (6)
where Pf , Pm,i and Pe,i,k are respectively given by (2), (3)
and (4) for a SU i ∈ S and coalition head k ∈ S.
It is clear from (5) and (6) that as the number of SUs per
coalition increases, the missing probability will decrease while
the probability of false alarm will increase. This is a crucial
trade off in collaborative spectrum sensing that can have a
major impact on the collaboration strategies of each SU. Thus,
our objective is to derive distributed strategies allowing the
SUs to collaborate while accounting for this trade off. An
example of the sought network structure is shown in Fig. 1.
III. COLLABORATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING AS
COALITIONAL GAME
In this section, we model the problem of collaborative
spectrum sensing as a coalitional game. Then we prove and
discuss its key properties.
A. Centralized Approach
A centralized approach can be used in order to find the
optimal coalition structure, such as in Fig.1, that allows the
SUs to maximize their benefits from collaborative spectrum
sensing. For instance, we seek a centralized solution that
minimizes the average missing probability (maximizes the
average detection probability) per SU subject to a false alarm
probability constraint per SU. In a centralized approach, we
assume the existence of a centralized entity in the network
that is able to gather information on the SUs such as their
individual missing probabilities or their location. In brief,
the centralized entity must be able to know all the required
parameters for computing the probabilities in (5) and (6) in
order to find the optimal structure. However, prior to deriving
such an optimal centralized solution, the following property
must be pinpointed within each coalition.
Property 1: The missing and false alarm probabilities of
any SU i ∈ S are given by the missing and false alarm
probabilities of the coalition S in (5) and (6), respectively.
Proof: Within each coalition S the SUs report their
sensing bits to the coalition head. In its turn the coalition
head of S combines the sensing bits using decision fusion
and makes a final decision on the presence or absence of the
PU. Thus, SUs belonging to a coalition S will transmit or not
based on the final coalition head decision. Consequently, the
missing and false alarm probabilities of any SU i ∈ S are
the missing and false alarm probabilities of the coalition S to
which i belongs as given by in (5) and (6), respectively.
As a consequence of Property 1 the required false alarm
probability constraint per SU directly maps to a false alarm
probability constraint per coalition. Therefore, denoting B as
the set of all partitions of N , the centralized approach seeks
to solve the following optimization problem
min
P∈B
∑
S∈P |S| ·Qm,S
N
, (7)
s.t. Qf,S ≤ α ∀ S ∈ P ,
where | · | represents the cardinality of a set operator and S is a
coalition belonging to the partition P . Clearly, the centralized
optimization problem seeks to find the optimal partition P∗ ∈
B that minimizes the average missing probability per SU,
subject to a false alarm constraint per SU (coalition).
However, it is shown in [9] that finding the optimal coalition
structure for solving an optimization problem such as in (7) is
an NP-complete problem. This is mainly due to the fact that
the number of possible coalition structures (partitions), given
by the Bell number, grows exponentially with the number of
SUs N [9]. Moreover, the complexity increases further due
to the fact that the expressions of Qm,S and Qf,S given by
(5) and (6) depend on the optimization parameter P . For
this purpose, deriving a distributed solution enabling the SUs
to benefit from collaborative spectrum sensing with a low
complexity is desirable. The above formulated centralized
approach will be used as a benchmark for the distributed
solution in the simulations, for reasonably small networks.
B. Game Formulation and Properties
For the purpose of deriving a distributed algorithm that can
minimize the missing probability per SU, we refer to coop-
erative game theory [10] which provides a set of analytical
tools suitable for such algorithms. For instance, the proposed
collaborative sensing problem can be modeled as a (N , v)
coalitional game [10] where N is the set of players (the SUs)
and v is the utility function or value of a coalition.
The value v(S) of a coalition S ⊆ N must capture the trade
off between the probability of detection and the probability
of false alarm. For this purpose, v(S) must be an increasing
function of the detection probability Qd,S = 1−Qm,S within
coalition S and a decreasing function of the false alarm
probability Qf,S . A suitable utility function is given by
v(S) = Qd,S − C(Qf,S) = (1 −Qm,S)− C(Qf,S), (8)
where Qm,S is the missing probability of coalition S given
by (5) and C(Qf,S) is a cost function of the false alarm
probability within coalition S given by (6).
First of all, we provide the following definition from [10]
and subsequently prove an interesting property pertaining to
the proposed game model.
Definition 1: A coalitional game (N , v) is said to have
a transferable utility if the value v(S) can be arbitrarily
apportioned between the coalition’s players. Otherwise, the
coalitional game has a non-transferable utility and each player
will have its own utility within coalition S.
Property 2: In the proposed collaborative sensing game,
the utility of a coalition S is equal to the utility of each SU
in the coalition, i.e., v(S) = φi(S), ∀ i ∈ S, where φi(S)
denotes the utility of SU i when i belongs to a coalition S.
Consequently, the proposed (N , v) coalitional game model has
a non-transferable utility.
Proof: The coalition value in the proposed game is given
by (8) and is a function of Qm,S and Qf,S . As per Property 1,
the missing probabilities for each SU i ∈ S are also given
by Qm,S and Qf,S and, thus, the utility of each SU i ∈ S
is φi(S) = v(S). Hence, the coalition value v(S) cannot be
arbitrarily apportioned among the users of a coalition; and the
proposed coalitional game has non-transferable utility.
In general, coalitional game based problems seek to char-
acterize the properties and stability of the grand coalition
of all players since it is generally assumed that the grand
coalition maximizes the utilities of the players [10]. In our
case, although collaborative spectrum sensing improves the
detection probability for the SUs; the cost in terms of false
alarm limits this gain. Therefore, for the proposed (N , v)
coalitional game we have the following property.
Property 3: For the proposed (N , v) coalitional game, the
grand coalition of all the SUs does not always form due to
the collaboration false alarm costs; thus disjoint independent
coalitions will form in the network.
Proof: By inspecting Qm,S in (5) and through the results
shown in [7] it is clear that as the number of SUs in a
coalition increase Qm,S decreases and the performance in
terms of detection probability improves. Hence, when no cost
for collaboration exists, the grand coalition of all SUs is the
optimal structure for maximizing the detection probability.
However, when the number of SUs in a coalition S increases,
it is shown in [7] through (5) that the false alarm probability
increases. Therefore, for the proposed collaborative spectrum
sensing model with cost for collaboration, the grand coalition
of all SUs will, in general, not form due to the false alarm
cost as taken into consideration in (8).
In a nutshell, we have a non-transferable (N , v) coalitional
game and we seek to derive a distributed algorithm for forming
coalitions among SUs. Before deriving such an algorithm, we
will delve into the details of the cost function in (8).
C. Cost Function
Any well designed cost function C(Qf,S) in (8) must satisfy
several requirements needed for adequately modeling the false
alarm cost. On one hand, C(Qf,S) must be an increasing
function of Qf,S with the increase slope becoming steeper as
Qf,S increases. On the other hand, the cost function C(Qf,S)
must impose a maximum tolerable false alarm probability, i.e.
an upper bound constraint on the false alarm, that cannot be
exceeded by any SU in a manner similar to the centralized
problem in (7) (due to Property 1, imposing a false alarm
constraint on the coalition maps to a constraint per SU).
A well suited cost function satisfying the above require-
ments is the logarithmic barrier penalty function given by [11]
C(Qf,S) =

−α
2 · log
(
1−
(
Qf,S
α
)2)
, if Qf,S < α,
+∞, if Qf,S ≥ α,
(9)
where log is the natural logarithm and α is a false alarm con-
straint per coalition (per SU). The cost function in (9) allows
to incur a penalty which is increasing with the false alarm
probability. Moreover, it imposes a maximum false alarm
probability per SU. In addition, as the false alarm probability
gets closer to α the cost for collaboration increases steeply,
requiring a significant improvement in detection probability if
the SUs wish to collaborate as per (8). Also, it is interesting to
note that the proposed cost function depends on both distance
and the number of SUs in the coalition, through the false alarm
probability Qf,S (the distance lies within the probability of
error). Hence, the cost for collaboration increases with the
number of SUs in the coalition as well as when the distance
between the coalition’s SUs increases.
IV. DISTRIBUTED COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a distributed coalition formation
algorithm and we discuss its main properties.
A. Coalition Formation Concepts
Coalition formation has been a topic of high interest in
game theory [9], [12]–[14]. The goal is to find algorithms for
characterizing the coalitional structures that form in a network
where the grand coalition is not optimal. For instance, a
generic framework for coalition formation is presented in [13]–
[15] whereby coalitions form and break through two simple
merge-and-split rules. This framework can be used to construct
a distributed coalition formation algorithm for collaborative
sensing, but first, we define the following concepts [13], [14].
Definition 2: A collection of coalitions, denoted S, is
defined as the set S = {S1, . . . , Sl} of mutually disjoint
coalitions Si ⊂ N . If the collection spans all the players of
N ; that is
⋃l
j=1 Sj = N , the collection is a partition of N .
Definition 3: A preference operator or comparison relation
⊲ is defined for comparing two collections R = {R1, . . . , Rl}
and S = {S1, . . . , Sm} that are partitions of the same subset
A ⊆ N (same players in R and S). Thus, R⊲S implies that
the way R partitions A is preferred to the way S partitions A
based on a criterion to be defined next.
Various criteria (referred to as orders) can be used as
comparison relations between collections or partitions [13],
[14]. These orders are divided into two main categories:
coalition value orders and individual value orders. Coalition
value orders compare two collections (or partitions) using
the value of the coalitions inside these collections such as
in the utilitarian order where R ⊲ S implies
∑l
i=1 v(Ri) >∑m
i=1 v(Si). Individual value orders perform the comparison
using the actual player utilities and not the coalition value.
For such orders, two collections R and S are seen as sets
of player utilities of the same length L (number of players).
The players’ utilities are either the payoffs after division
of the value of the coalitions in a collection (transferable
utility) or the actual utilities of the players belonging to the
coalitions in a collection (non-transferable utility). Due to the
non-transferable nature of the proposed (N , v) collaborative
sensing game (Property 2), an individual value order must
be used as a comparison relation ⊲. An important example
of individual value orders is the Pareto order. Denote for a
collection R = {R1, . . . , Rl}, the utility of a player j in
a coalition Rj ∈ R by φj(R) = φj(Rj) = v(Rj) (as per
Property 2); hence, the Pareto order is defined as follows
R⊲ S ⇐⇒ {φj(R) ≥ φj(S) ∀ j ∈ R,S}, (10)
with at least one strict inequality (>) for a player k.
Due to the non-transferable nature of the proposed collabora-
tive sensing model, the Pareto order is an adequate preference
relation. Having defined the various concepts, we derive a dis-
tributed coalition formation algorithm in the next subsection.
B. Coalition Formation Algorithm
For autonomous coalition formation in cognitive radio net-
works, we propose a distributed algorithm based on two simple
rules denoted as “merge” and “split” that allow to modify a
partition T of the SUs set N as follows [13].
Definition 4: Merge Rule - Merge any set of coalitions
{S1, . . . , Sl} where {
⋃l
j=1 Sj} ⊲ {S1, . . . , Sl}, therefore,
{S1, . . . , Sl} → {
⋃l
j=1 Sj}, (each Si is a coalition in T ).
Definition 5: Split Rule - Split any coalition
⋃l
j=1 Sj
where {S1, . . . , Sl} ⊲ {
⋃l
j=1 Sj}, thus, {
⋃l
j=1 Sj} →
{S1, . . . , Sl}, (each Si is a coalition in T ).
Using the above rules, multiple coalitions can merge into a
larger coalition if merging yields a preferred collection based
on the selected order ⊲. Similarly, a coalition would split
into smaller coalitions if splitting yields a preferred collection.
When ⊲ is the Pareto order, coalitions will merge (split) only if
at least one SU is able to strictly improve its individual utility
through this merge (split) without decreasing the other SUs’
utilities. By using the merge-and-split rules combined with
the Pareto order, a distributed coalition formation algorithm
suited for collaborative spectrum sensing can be constructed.
First and foremost, the appeal of forming coalitions using
merge-and-split stems from the fact that it has been shown
in [13] and [14] that any arbitrary iteration of merge-and-split
operations terminates. Moreover, each merge or split decision
can be taken in a distributed manner by each individual SU or
by each already formed coalition. Subsequently, a merge-and-
split coalition algorithm can adequately model the distributed
interactions among the SUs of a cognitive network that are
seeking to collaborate in the sensing process.
In consequence, for the proposed collaborative sensing
game, we construct a coalition formation algorithm based on
merge-and-split and divided into three phases: local sensing,
adaptive coalition formation, and coalition sensing. In the local
sensing phase, each individual SU computes its own local PU
detection bit based on the received PU signal. In the adaptive
coalition formation phase, the SUs (or existing coalitions of
SUs) interact in order to assess whether to share their sensing
results with nearby coalitions. For this purpose, an iteration
of sequential merge-and-split rules occurs in the network,
whereby each coalition decides to merge (or split) depending
on the utility improvement that merging (or splitting) yields.
In the final coalition sensing phase, once the network topology
converges following merge-and-split, SUs that belong to the
same coalition report their local sensing bits to their local
coalition head. The coalition head subsequently uses decision
fusion OR-rule to make a final decision on the presence or
the absence of the PU. This decision is then reported by the
coalition heads to all the SUs within their respective coalitions.
Each round of the three phases of the proposed algorithm
starts from an initial network partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of
N . During the adaptive coalition formation phase any random
coalition (individual SU) can start with the merge process. For
implementation purposes, assume that the coalition Ti ∈ T
which has the highest utility in the initial partition T starts the
merge by attempting to collaborate with a nearby coalition. On
one hand, if merging occurs, a new coalition T˜i is formed and,
in its turn, coalition T˜i will attempt to merge with a nearby
SU that can improve its utility. On the other hand, if Ti is
unable to merge with the firstly discovered partner, it tries to
find other coalitions that have a mutual benefit in merging. The
search ends by a final merged coalition T finali composed of Ti
and one or several of coalitions in its vicinity (T finali = Ti,
if no merge occurred). The algorithm is repeated for the
remaining Ti ∈ T until all the coalitions have made their
merge decisions, resulting in a final partition F . Following
the merge process, the coalitions in the resulting partition
F are next subject to split operations, if any is possible.
An iteration consisting of multiple successive merge-and-split
operations is repeated until it terminates. It must be stressed
that the decisions to merge or split can be taken in a distributed
way without relying on any centralized entity as each SU or
coalition can make its own decision for merging or splitting.
Table I summarizes one round of the proposed algorithm.
For handling environmental changes such as mobility or the
joining/leaving of SUs, Phase 2 of the proposed algorithm in
Table I is repeated periodically. In Phase 2, periodically, as
time evolves and SUs (or the PU) move or join/leave, the SUs
can autonomously self-organize and adapt the network’s topol-
ogy through new merge-and-split iterations with each coalition
taking the decision to merge (or split) subject to satisfying
the merge (or split) rule through Pareto order (10). In other
words, every period of time θ the SUs assess the possibility of
splitting into smaller coalitions or merging with new partners.
The period θ is smaller in highly mobile environments to allow
a more adequate adaptation of the topology. Similarly, every
period θ, in the event where the current coalition head of a
coalition has moved or is turned off, the coalition members
may select a new coalition head if needed. The convergence
of this merge-and-split adaptation to environmental changes is
always guaranteed, since, by definition of the merge and split
rules, any iteration of these rules certainly terminates.
For the proposed coalition formation algorithm, an upper
bound on the maximum coalition size is imposed by the
proposed utility and cost models in (8) and (9) as follows:
Theorem 1: For the proposed collaborative sensing model,
any coalition structure resulting from the distributed coalition
TABLE I
ONE ROUND OF THE PROPOSED COLLABORATIVE SENSING ALGORITHMInitial State
The network is partitioned by T = {T1, . . . , Tk} (At the beginning
of all time T = N = {1, . . . , N} with non-cooperative SUs).
Three phases in each round of the coalition formation algorithm
Phase 1 - Local Sensing:
Each individual SU computes its local PU signal sensing bit.
Phase 2 - Adaptive Coalition Formation:
In this phase, coalition formation using merge-and-split occurs.
repeat
a) F = Merge(T ); coalitions in T decide to merge
based on the merge algorithm explained in Section IV-B.
b) T = Split(F ); coalitions in F decide to split based on
the Pareto order.
until merge-and-split terminates.
Phase 3 - Coalition Sensing:
a) Each SU reports its sensing bit to the coalition head.
b) The coalition head of each coalition makes a final decision on
the absence or presence of he PU using decision fusion OR-rule.
c) The SUs in a coalition abide by the final decision made by the
coalition head.
The above phases are repeated throughout the network operation.
In Phase 2, through distributed and periodic merge-and-split
decisions, the SUs can autonomously adapt the network topology
to environmental changes such as mobility.
formation algorithm will have coalitions limited in size to a
maximum of Mmax = log (1−α)log (1−Pf ) SUs.
Proof: For forming coalitions, the proposed algorithm
requires an improvement in the utility of the SUs through
Pareto order. However, the benefit from collaboration is limited
by the false alarm probability cost modeled by the barrier
function (9). A minimum false alarm cost in a coalition S with
coalition head k ∈ S exists whenever the reporting channel is
perfect, i.e., exhibiting no error, hence Pe,i,k = 0 ∀i ∈ S.
In this perfect case, the false alarm probability in a perfect
coalition Sp is given by
Qf,Sp = 1−
∏
i∈Sp
(1− Pf ) = 1− (1− Pf )
|Sp|, (11)
where |Sp| is the number of SUs in the perfect coalition Sp.
A perfect coalition Sp where the reporting channels inside
are perfect (i.e. SUs are grouped very close to each other)
can accommodate the largest number of SUs relative to other
coalitions. Hence, we can use this perfect coalition to find an
upper bound on the maximum number of SUs per coalition.
For instance, the log barrier function in (9) tends to infinity
whenever the false alarm probability constraint per coalition
is reached which implies an upper bound on the maximum
number of SUs per coalition if Qf,Sp ≥ α, yielding by (11)
|Sp| ≤
log (1− α)
log (1− Pf )
=Mmax . (12)
It is interesting to note that the maximum size of a coalition
Mmax depends mainly on two parameters: the false alarm
constraint α and the non-cooperative false alarm Pf . For
instance, larger false alarm constraints allow larger coalitions,
as the maximum tolerable cost limit for collaboration is
increased. Moreover, as the non-cooperative false alarm Pf
decreases, the possibilities for collaboration are better since
the increase of the false alarm due to coalition size becomes
smaller as per (6). It must be noted that the dependence of
Mmax on Pf yields a direct dependence of Mmax on the
energy detection threshold λ as per (2). Finally, it is interesting
to see that the upper bound on the coalition size does not
depend on the location of the SUs in the network nor on the
actual number of SUs in the network. Therefore, deploying
more SUs or moving the SUs in the network for a fixed α
and Pf does not increase the upper bound on coalition size.
C. Stability
The result of the proposed algorithm in Table I is a
network partition composed of disjoint independent coalitions
of SUs. The stability of this resulting network structure can be
investigated using the concept of a defection function D [13].
Definition 6: A defection function D is a function which
associates with each partition T of N a group of collections
in N . A partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of N is D-stable if no
group of players is interested in leaving T when the players
who leave can only form the collections allowed by D.
Two important defection functions must be characterized
[13]–[15]. First, the Dhp(T ) function (denoted Dhp) which
associates with each partition T of N the group of all
partitions of N that the players can form through merge-
and-split operations applied to T . This function allows any
group of players to leave the partition T of N through merge-
and-split operations to create another partition in N . Second,
the Dc(T ) function (denoted Dc) which associates with each
partition T of N the family of all collections in N . This
function allows any group of players to leave the partition T
of N through any operation and create an arbitrary collection
in N . Two forms of stability stem from these definitions: Dhp
stability and a stronger Dc stability. A partition T is Dhp-
stable, if no players in T are interested in leaving T through
merge-and-split to form other partitions in N ; while a partition
T is Dc-stable, if no players in T are interested in leaving T
through any operation (not necessary merge or split) to form
other collections in N .
Characterizing any type of D-stability for a partition de-
pends on various properties of its coalitions. For instance, a
partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} is Dhp-stable if, for the partition
T , no coalition has an incentive to split or merge. As an
immediate result of the definition of Dhp-stability we have
Theorem 2: Every partition resulting from our proposed
coalition formation algorithm is Dhp-stable.
Briefly, a Dhp-stable can be thought of as a state of equilibrium
where no coalitions have an incentive to pursue coalition
formation through merge or split. With regards to Dc stability,
the work in [13]–[15] proved that a Dc-stable partition has the
following properties:
1) If it exists, a Dc-stable partition is the unique outcome
of any arbitrary iteration of merge-and-split and is a
Dhp-stable partition.
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Fig. 2. Average missing probabilities (average over locations of SUs and non-
cooperative false alarm range Pf ∈ (0, α) ) vs. number of SUs.
2) A Dc-stable partition T is a unique⊲-maximal partition,
that is for all partitions T ′ 6= T ofN , T ⊲T ′. In the case
where ⊲ represents the Pareto order, this implies that
the Dc-stable partition T is the partition that presents a
Pareto optimal utility distribution for all the players.
However, the existence of a Dc-stable partition is not always
guaranteed [13]. The Dc-stable partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of
the whole space N exists if a partition of N that verifies the
following two necessary and sufficient conditions exists [13]:
1) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and each pair of disjoint
coalitions S1 and S2 such that {S1 ∪S2} ⊆ Ti we have
{S1 ∪ S2}⊲ {S1, S2}.
2) For the partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} a coalition G ⊂
N formed of players belonging to different Ti ∈ T
is T -incompatible if for no i ∈ {1, . . . , l} we have
G ⊂ Ti. Dc-stability requires that for all T -incompatible
coalitions {G}[T ]⊲{G} where {G}[T ] = {G∩Ti ∀ i ∈
{1, . . . , l}} is the projection of coalition G on T .
If no partition of N can satisfy these conditions, then no Dc-
stable partitions of N exists. Nevertheless, we have
Lemma 1: For the proposed (N , v) collaborative sensing
coalitional game, the proposed algorithm of Table I converges
to the optimal Dc-stable partition, if such a partition exists.
Otherwise, the proposed algorithm yields a final network
partition that is Dhp-stable.
Proof: The proof is an immediate consequence of The-
orem 2 and the fact that the Dc-stable partition is a unique
outcome of any arbitrary merge-and-split iteration which is
the case with any partition resulting from our algorithm.
Moreover, for the proposed game, the existence of the Dc-
stable partition cannot be always guaranteed. For instance,
for verifying the first condition for existence of the Dc-stable
partition, the SUs belonging to partitions of each coalitions
must verify the Pareto order through their utility given by
(8). Similarly, for verifying the second condition of Dc sta-
bility, SUs belonging to all T -incompatible coalitions in the
network must verify the Pareto order. Consequently, finding a
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Fig. 3. Average false alarm probabilities (average over locations of SUs and
non-cooperative false alarm range Pf ∈ (0, α) ) vs. number of SUs.
geometrical closed-form condition for the existence of such a
partition is not feasible as it depends on the location of the
SUs and the PU through the individual missing and false alarm
probabilities in the utility expression (8). Hence, the existence
of the Dc-stable partition is closely tied to the location of the
SUs and the PU which both can be random parameters in
practical networks. However, the proposed algorithm will al-
ways guarantee convergence to this optimal Dc-stable partition
when it exists as stated in Lemma 1. Whenever a Dc-stable
partition does not exist, the coalition structure resulting from
the proposed algorithm will be Dhp-stable (no coalition or SU
is able to merge or split any further).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulations, the following network is set up: The PU
is placed at the origin of a 3 km ×3 km square with the
SUs randomly deployed in the area around the PU. We set
the time bandwidth product m = 5 [5]–[7], the PU transmit
power PPU = 100 mW, the SU transmit power for reporting
the sensing bit Pi = 10 mW ∀i ∈ N and the noise level
σ2 = −90 dBm. For path loss, we set µ = 3 and κ = 1.
The maximum false alarm constraint is set to α = 0.1, as
recommended by the IEEE 802.22 standard [16].
In Figs. 2 and 3 we show, respectively, the average missing
probabilities and the average false alarm probabilities achieved
per SU for different network sizes. These probabilities are
averaged over random locations of the SUs as well as a range
of energy detection thresholds λ that do not violate the false
alarm constraint; this in turn, maps into an average over the
non-cooperative false alarm range Pf ∈ (0, α) (obviously, for
Pf > α no cooperation is possible). In Fig. 2, we show that
the proposed algorithm yields a significant improvement in the
average missing probability reaching up to 86.6% reduction
(at N = 30) compared to the non-cooperative case. This
advantage is increasing with the network size N . However,
there exists a gap in the performance of the proposed algorithm
and that of the optimal centralized solution. This gap stems
mainly from the fact that the log barrier function used in
the distributed algorithm (9) increases the cost drastically
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Pf (or energy detection threshold λ) for N = 7 SUs.
when the false alarm probability is in the vicinity of α. This
increased cost makes it harder for coalitions with false alarm
levels close to α to collaborate in the distributed approach
as they require a large missing probability improvement to
compensate the cost in their utility (8) so that a Pareto order
merge or split becomes possible. However, albeit the proposed
cost function yields a performance gap in terms of missing
probability, it forces a false alarm for the distributed case
smaller than that of the centralized solution as seen in Fig. 3.
For instance, Fig. 3 shows that the achieved average false
alarm by the proposed distributed solution outperforms that
of the centralized solution but is still outperformed by the
non-cooperative case. Thus, while the centralized solution
achieves a better missing probability; the proposed distributed
algorithm compensates this performance gap through the av-
erage achieved false alarm. In summary, Figs. 2 and 3 clearly
show the performance trade off that exists between the gains
achieved by collaborative spectrum sensing in terms of average
missing probability and the corresponding cost in terms of
average false alarm probability.
In Fig. 4, we show the average missing probabilities per
SU for different energy detection thresholds λ expressed by
the feasible range of non-cooperative false alarm probabilities
Pf ∈ (0, α) for N = 7. In this figure, we show that as
the non-cooperative Pf decreases the performance advantage
of collaborative spectrum sensing for both the centralized
and distributed solutions increases (except for very small Pf
where the advantage in terms of missing probability reaches
its maximum). The performance gap between centralized
and distributed is once again compensated by a false alarm
advantage for the distributed solution as already seen and
explained in Fig. 3 for N = 7. Finally, in this figure, it must
be noted that as Pf approaches α = 0.1, the advantage for
collaborative spectrum sensing diminishes drastically as the
network converges towards the non-cooperative case.
In Fig. 5, we show a snapshot of the network structure
resulting from the proposed distributed algorithm (dashed
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Fig. 5. Final coalition structure from both distributed (dashed line) and
centralized (solid line) collaborative spectrum sensing for N = 7 SUs.
line) as well as the centralized approach (solid line) for
N = 7 randomly placed SUs and a non-cooperative false
alarm Pf = 0.01. We notice that the structures resulting
from both approaches are almost comparable, with nearby SUs
forming collaborative coalitions for improving their missing
probabilities. However, for the distributed solution, SU 4 is
part of coalition S1 = {1, 2, 4, 6} while for the centralized
approach SU 4 is part of coalition {3, 4, 5}. This difference in
the network structure is due to the fact that, in the distributed
case, SU 4 acts selfishly while aiming at improving its own
utility. In fact, by merging with {3, 5} SU 4 achieves a utility
of φ4({3, 5}) = 0.9859 with a missing probability of 0.0024
whereas by merging with {1, 2, 6} SU 4 achieves a utility
of φ4({1, 2, 4, 6}) = 0.9957 with a missing probability of
0.00099. Thus, when acting autonomously in a distributed
manner, SU 4 prefers to merge with {1, 2, 6} rather than with
{3, 5} regardless of the optimal structure for the network as a
whole. In brief, Fig. 5 shows how the cognitive network struc-
tures itself for both centralized and distributed approaches.
Furthermore, in Fig. 6 we show how our distributed algo-
rithm in Table I handles mobility during Phase 2 (adaptive
coalition formation). For this purpose, after the network struc-
ture in Fig. 5 has formed, we allow SU 1 to move horizontally
along the positive x-axis while other SUs are immobile. In
Fig. 6, at the beginning, the utilities of SUs {1, 2, 4, 6} are
similar since they belong to the same coalition. These utilities
decrease as SU 1 distances itself from {2, 4, 6}. After moving
0.8 km SUs {1, 6} split from coalition {1, 2, 4, 6} by Pareto
order as φ1({1, 6}) = 0.9906 > φ1({1, 2, 4, 6}) = 0.99,
φ6({1, 6}) = 0.9906 > φ6({1, 2, 4, 6}) = 0.99, φ2({2, 4}) =
0.991 > φ2({1, 2, 4, 6}) = 0.99 and φ4({2, 4}) = 0.991 >
φ4({1, 2, 4, 6} = 0.99) (this small advantage from splitting
increases as SU 1 moves further). As SU 1 distances itself
further from the PU, its utility and that of its partner SU 6
decrease. Subsequently, as SU 1 moves 1.4 km it finds it
beneficial to split from {1, 6} and merge with SU 7. Through
this merge, SU 1 and SU 7 improve their utilities. Meanwhile,
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Fig. 6. Self-adaptation of the network’s topology to mobility through merge-
and-split as SU 1 moves horizontally on the positive x-axis.
SU 6 rejoins SUs {2, 4} forming a 3-SU coalition {2, 4, 6}
while increasing the utilities of all three SUs. In a nutshell,
this figure illustrates how adaptive coalition formation through
merge and split operates in a mobile cognitive radio network.
Similar results can be seen whenever all SUs are mobile or
even the PU is mobile but they are omitted for space limitation.
In Fig. 7, for a network of N = 30 SUs, we evaluate the
sizes of the coalitions resulting from our distributed algorithm
and compare them with the the upper bound Mmax derived in
Theorem 1. First and foremost, as the non-cooperative Pf in-
creases, both the maximum and the average size of the formed
coalitions decrease converging towards the non-cooperative
case as Pf reaches the constraint α = 0.1. Through this
result, we can clearly see the limitations that the detection-
false alarm probabilities trade off for collaborative sensing
imposes on the coalition size and network topology. Also, in
Fig. 7, we show that, albeit the upper bound on coalition size
Mmax increases drastically as Pf becomes smaller, the average
maximum coalition size achieved by the proposed algorithm
does not exceed 4 SUs per coalition for the given network
with N = 30. This result shows that, in general, the network
topology is composed of a large number of small coalitions
rather than a small number of large coalitions, even when Pf
is small and the collaboration possibilities are high.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel distributed algorithm for
collaborative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks.
We modeled the collaborative sensing problem as a coali-
tional game with non-transferable utility and we derived a
distributed algorithm for coalition formation. The proposed
coalition formation algorithm is based on two simple rules
of merge-and-split that enable SUs in a cognitive network
to cooperate for improving their detection probability while
taking into account the cost in terms of false alarm probability.
We characterized the network structure resulting from the
proposed algorithm, studied its stability and showed that a
maximum number of SUs per coalition exists for the proposed
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Fig. 7. Maximum and average coalition size vs. non-cooperative false alarm
Pf (or energy detection threshold λ) for the distributed solution for N =
30 SUs.
utility model. Simulation results showed that the proposed
distributed algorithm reduces the average missing probability
per SU up to 86.6% compared to the non-cooperative case.
The results also showed how, through the proposed algorithm,
the SUs can autonomously adapt the network structure to
environmental changes such as mobility. Through simulations,
we also compared the performance of the proposed algorithm
with that of an optimal centralized solution.
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